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Resumo
Apresentamos uma análise da trajetória 
institucional e política das iniciativas brasileiras 
em ciência, tecnologia e inovação, a partir da 
criação do CNPq, com ênfase na dinâmica interna 
do Estado, descrevendo o contexto e a dinâmica 
de institucionalização do setor embalado por os 
diagnósticos de desenvolvimento e o renovado 
prestígio da “ciência” típico daqueles anos. O 
objetivo da análise é verificar resultados conhecidos 
da literatura sobre estado, instituições e atores 
no Brasil e basear a pesquisa empírica no poder 
executivo nesse campo político. A interpretação dos 
dados foi orientada a fim de reconstruir a trajetória 
do setor, enfocando a dinâmica interna da arena 
de decisão e suas restrições políticas. Os resultados 
confirmam generalizações teóricas da literatura do 
Poder Executivo no Brasil, como a centralidade das 
redes de contatos pessoais na implementação de 
políticas nas décadas de 1960 e 1970.
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Abstract
We present an analysis of the institutional and 
political trajectory of Brazilian initiatives in science, 
technology and innovation, starting from the 
creation of CNPq, with emphasis on the internal 
dynamics of the Statedescribing the context 
and the institutionalization dynamics of the 
sector packed by the developmental diagnoses 
and the renewed prestige of “science” typical 
of those years. The purpose of the analysis is 
to verify known results from the literature on 
state, institutions and actors in Brazil and to base 
empirical research on the executive power in this 
policy field. The interpretation of the data was 
oriented in order to reconstruct the trajectory of 
the sector focusing on the internal dynamics of 
the decision arena and its political constraints. 
The results confirm theoretical generalizations 
of the Executive Power literature in Brazil, such 
as the centrality of personal contact networks in 
the implementation of policies in the 1960s and 
1970s. 
Keywords: Executive power; actors and 
institutions; bureaucracy and politics; science, 
technology and innovation; CNPq.
Daniel Francisco Nagao Menezes*
*  Master and PhD in Political and Economic Law (Universidade Presbiteriana Mackenzie, São Paulo). Post-Doctor 
in Law (FADUSP, Faculty of Law, University of São Paulo). Professor of the Graduate Program in Political and 
Economic Law at the Faculty of Law, Universidade Presbiteriana Mackenzie. Member of CIRIEC-Brasil (Centro de 
Estudos e Pesquisas em Economia Pública Social). E-mail: nagao.menezes@gmail.com
68 Desenvolvimento em Debate
Daniel Francisco Nagao Menezes
INTRODUCTION
The most recent theories on the dynamics of public policy have stated that they may 
go through long periods of stability or may change rapidly. One of the most widespread 
analytical frameworks for policy analysis today, the punctuated equilibrium theory, 
considers that public policy subsystems are homeostatic. This means that they have 
a regulating mechanism capable of keeping their output stable or modifying them 
radically and rapidly to adapt to pressures arising from interaction with their external 
environment. This is because the effects of policy implementation on the environment 
affect the internal dynamics of the subsystem through negative and positive feedback 
action (BAUMGARTNER & JONES 2002; 1991; JONES, BAUMGARTNER & TRUE, 1998).
Paul Pierson sharply criticized homeostatic approaches when he advocated 
considering the historical trajectory of policies for consistent analysis. According to 
the author, focusing on the dramatic moments of change ultimately neglects the 
importance of what happens before and after them. Another aspect of the criticism 
was that those models disregard the possibility that substantive changes occur slowly: 
“The fact that something happens slowly does not make it unimportant” (PIERSON, 2005, 
p.40). Pierson’s recommendation requires that methodologically, stability analyzes 
and policy changes be carried out under detailed reconstitutions of his trajectory 
with respect to the internal dynamics of his institutional and political aspects. Authors 
from the field of science, technology and society in Brazil have drawn attention to 
the strong paradigmatic stability that characterizes the decision-making process of 
Brazilian science, technology and innovation policy (S&T, CT&I or PCTI policy - see 
abbreviation list at the end) (Dagnino 2007). This important result, combined with 
the theoretical debate on homeostatic policy subsystems, motivates an analysis of 
the trajectory of the Brazilian PCTI with an emphasis on the structure of internal state 
processes. This task joins the effort of a research community that since the late 1990s 
has been developing detailed analyzes of the mechanisms that internally structure the 
decision-making arenas of the executive branch (FIGUEIREDO 2004; MARQUES 2006; 
D’ARAUJO 2009; BORGES, 2010).
The work of reconstructing the institutional trajectory of Brazilian ST&I policies, 
focusing on the internal dynamics of the state, is a step towards grounding empirical 
research on the executive power in this field of public policies. Their bodies have 
characteristics similar to those responsible for monetary and economic policies, 
for example, such as the high degree of isolation and institutionalization. Empirical 
research such as those already carried out for the Central Bank (OLIVIERI, 2007) and the 
Ministry of Finance (LOUREIRO, ABRÚCIO & ROSA, 1998) cannot disregard a review of 
the trajectory of the state’s internal dynamics in the sector.
This article, however, has its own objective, which is to verify known results of 
the Executive Power literature in this policy field: to investigate the role of personal 
contact networks and the dynamics of bureaucracy isolation for the realization of 
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policy models. Which are either still in place or have a decisive influence on current 
diagnostics and implementation tools. Ben Schneider initially verified the prevalence 
of personal contacts in the mechanisms that gave stability and effectiveness to the 
developmental policies of the 1970s in his analysis of the bureaucracy and Brazilian 
industrial policy in the military regime (SCHNEIDER, 1994). Eduardo Marques showed 
how the internal groups of the bureaucracy are able to structure the interior of the 
state: the level of negotiation that the political groups invested with the institutional 
power will be forced to engage with groups of the bureaucracy depends on their 
strength and prestige and the degree of isolation of the state organizations involved 
(MARQUES, 2006).
Some authors have already sought to describe a trajectory of S&T in Brazil: 
by periodizations that highlight the life and work of prominent scientists located 
in their institutional and historical contexts, or by trajectory descriptions of 
policy implementation programs and instruments (SCHWARTZMAN, 1979; 2001; 
BALBACHEVSKY, 2010). In addition to these pioneering efforts, our descriptive emphasis 
is intended to contribute new elements to the discussion. For the reconstitution of 
the political-institutional trajectory of the Brazilian ST&I arena after World War II, we 
used secondary data from works of historiographic bias such as Campos Muniz (2008), 
which recorded the “oral history” of CNPq by collecting more than 30 interviews with 
technicians and former Council directors who served on the board between the 1970´s 
and 1990´s; Albagli (1987), who compiled the trajectory of laws, decrees and other 
legal instruments that introduced changes in the institutional format of the CNPq’s 
operation until 1974; Marques (1992), who reports the history of Brazilian nuclear 
policy; Vieira and Videira (2007), who present the history and historiography of physics 
in Brazil, Moreira (2014), which describes the tensions between the authoritarian 
regime and the community of physicists; and Videira (2010), which discusses the 
historical background of the Ministry of Science and Technology. Other reports such 
as Guimarães (1995), which analyzed the trajectory of the technological development 
policy until the early 1990s, and Ferrari (2010), which reported BNDE’s actions in S&T 
between the 1960s and 1970s, constituted important sources of information about the 
decision-making process in ST&I in Brazil. We also consulted the CNPq general archive 
in Brasilia, where we had access to minutes of Deliberative Council meetings dating 
back to the 1950s and other documents.
THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE BRAZILIAN ST&I 
SUBSYSTEM: FIRST PHASE
The institutionalization of the CT&I (PCTI) policy in Brazil took place in the 
post-World War II context, with the creation of the CNPq in 1951. By this time, the 
foundational foundations of the modern Brazilian state apparatus were already laid. 
It is also at this point that the providers of the cognitive foundations of the Latin 
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American developmental project were beginning to realize that achieving economic 
development solely through capital accumulation would be a thankless task to 
pursue. Technological development was beginning to gain ground as an argument of 
necessity for the strategic policy of the modern developmental state.
The moment of CNPq’s creation was marked, at the international level, by the 
institutionalization of a policy paradigm for the area of  S&T. The Bush Report, prepared 
by Vannevar Bush and presented to then-US President Franklin Roosevelt at the end of 
World War II, is considered a milestone in the institutionalization of a S&T policy model 
whose decision-making arena was politically centered on scientists (BUSH, 1945). . 
The model, which would become paradigmatic and known as science push, marked 
the initial moment when government planning in S&T was gaining a privileged place 
in the political agenda of governments. The period known as the “Big Science Era”, 
which runs from the end of World War II to the late 1970s, was characterized by the 
existence of large projects and steadily growing budgets for S&T activities. The role 
of scientists in this policy paradigm goes beyond the exercise of cognitive authority; 
they act as political regulators of the decision-making process, defining both the 
thematic development agenda and implementation strategies. This performance was 
supported by normative propositions for the functioning of scientific activity such 
as Robert Merton, who affirmed neutrality as ethos of science and scientist (VELHO, 
2011).
Internally, there was a dynamic that put on opposite sides groups of the scientific 
community linked to the Brazilian Academy of Sciences (ABC), based in Rio de Janeiro, 
and groups based in the state of São Paulo. This dynamic explains the context of the 
founding of the Brazilian Society for the Progress of Science (SBPC), in 1948, which 
even claiming to be a “national society, without political or religious color”, almost 
exclusively records the presence of researchers from other institutions. From the state 
of São Paulo (besides entrepreneurs and professionals from the technological sectors). 
The background of this obvious antagonism was the political context of the period 
prior to the democratization of the 1940´s period. SBPC was founded by paulistas in the 
context of the re-democratization of the post-World War II period, and has remained 
linked to research institutions in São Paulo for several decades.
The SBPC was founded on policy guidelines that sought to broaden the scope of 
S&T debates. Admission to his paintings was not exclusive to scientists; his founding 
minutes record the signature of a “farmer”, for example. His proposal, it seems, was to 
become an entity recognized by broad sectors of society as a legitimate representative 
of social demands for S&T, which would make it more politically advantageous 
than the traditional Brazilian Academy of Sciences (ABC), given its aristocratic and 
conservative profile, in the context of the democratic opening of the 1940s. ABC was 
not an entity capable of representing the different interests on the S&T agenda that 
already occupied the attention of different sectors of Brazilian society at that time. 
SBPC had 352 members a year after its founding and adopted free admission to its 
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staff, while ABC limited its membership to 100, always acting privately with respect to 
new admissions.
The conflicts surrounding the first institutional phase of the Brazilian PCTI, and 
which had a lasting influence on it, were strongly influenced by this national and 
international context. CNPq’s first president was a naval school officer who had 
also presided over ABC. Admiral Alvaro Alberto da Mota e Silva represented Brazil 
at the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission meetings during the 1940s. He 
was therefore involved in discussions on nuclear technology in the immediate 
postwar period. This previous experience marked his political positions on Brazilian 
technological autonomy in the nuclear sector. However, the creation of the CNPq also 
had the support and intense involvement of the nuclear physicist’s community, mostly 
linked to the University of Sao Paulo, who had close ties with their US counterparts 
who took part in the war efforts. They knew the prestigious environment in which 
physicists in that country lived, and intended to emulate such an environment in Brazil 
by reproducing the institutional foundations of the science push model.
However, the appointment to the CNPq presidency of a naval officer aligned with 
positions advocating autonomous nuclear technology development created two 
potential friction zones with the scientific community. The first, because the science 
push model foresees the transfer of both the material power and the symbolic power 
of S&T policy to scientists, which was not the case in Brazil. In the US, physicist Alan 
Waterman, who had previously lectured at Cincinnati and Yale universities, first served 
the newly created National Science Foundation. The second, because after the use of 
nuclear artifacts in Japan, came the general inclination of the community of physicists, 
even some who participated in the war effort, to positions contrary to their proliferation 
(ROSA, 2005). Brazil was already recognized as possessing vast and important deposits 
of atomic ores, and the important political decision that lurked behind the scenes of 
power was whether to become an exporter of these ores or to develop technology 
for their use. It was in this context that foreshadowed the conflicts that marked the 
institutionalization phase of the Brazilian State’s activities in the S&T sector, that Álvaro 
Alberto began the creation of the CNPq and the structuring of its bureaucracy.
The body was created under the name of “National Research Council” by Law No. 
1310 of January 15, 1951, as “a legal entity reporting directly and immediately to the 
President of the Republic”. The founding law expressly provided for its “technical-
scientific, administrative and financial autonomy” and referred to a regulation the 
definitions of the forms of admission, the work regime and the duties of its staff, 
although it already guaranteed the prerogative of admitting, “Staff not characterized 
as permanent”. The regulation on personnel standards followed shortly, in the form 
of Decree No. 29,433 of 4 April 1951. It contained the categorization of Council staff 
as “scientific, technical, teaching and administrative”. It was anticipated that the 
chairperson should appoint teaching staff, and public servants required under current 
law would staff that entire administrative staff.
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Thus, Álvaro Alberto was able to rely on the staff of scientists and technicians he 
trusted, as well as having administrative staff with experience working in other public 
administration bodies. Regarding the profile of Álvaro Alberto’s bureaucracy, we know 
that the presence of engineers in the leadership posts and in the composition of the 
Deliberative Council was dominant. There was also the presence of nuclear physicists, 
such as César Lattes and Bernhard Gross, experienced military personnel and politically 
connected civil servants. They also formed the first generation of bureaucrats and 
policy makers in Brazil’s S&T sector.
We argue that the intensity of the political debates of those times and their 
thematic focus, which brought S&T policy to the center of the discussions now, helped 
in the rapid formation and cohesion of the internal groups that structured the agency’s 
work. The broader political environment at the time opposed two blocks of actors who 
held opposing positions on how to combine international relations and economic 
development. On the one hand were those who advocated greater alignment with 
the relational dynamics formulated by the US, on the other, those who advocated 
positions of independence and economic and technological autonomy. This debate 
marked the first moments of the institutional isolation of the Brazilian PCTI led by the 
“nationalist” Álvaro Alberto, during the early 1950s.
Supported by the military and the engineering sector of the scientific community, 
which at the time were leading these activities in Brazil, Alberto opposed the guidelines 
issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the policy of exporting atomic minerals and 
the acquisition of nuclear technology. Cervo & Bueno (1992), in their widespread history 
of Brazilian Foreign Policy, reported on the political context and an important fact that 
supports the suggestion of the rapid cohesion of internal groups and illustrates the 
nature of CNPq’s isolation at that time: The Council, contrary to the agreements signed 
by the Brazilian government with the US, would have quietly negotiated with German 
companies to buy three uranium enrichment ultracentrifuges in January 1954.
The groups that at that time internally structured the CNPq were mostly composed 
of professional bureaucrats, military personnel, and engineers who made up the 
scientific community of the time. They were fundamental references in the intense 
debates on the use of atomic minerals that were reflected in the government itself 
and in Congress. They enjoyed a high degree of isolation and autonomy, which left 
them in the position of leading political clashes of great relevance. They were deeply 
involved in one of the chapters of the political conflict that culminated in Vargas’s 
suicide. The authors also note, “with the rise of Café Filho, the difference in view of the 
atomic question between the CNPq and Itamaraty would be accentuated” (CERVO & 
BUENO, 1992, p.283).
The position of the allied political groups of the internal groups formed in the 
newly created Brazilian PCTI institutional structure did not prevail after the change of 
government in the mid-1950s. Álvaro Alberto eventually resigned his post as president 
of the CNPq in March 1955. As a result, many changes were made to the composition 
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of the Deliberative Council, the board of directors and the office of the president of 
CNPq. The events that occurred during the political disputes led to the first institutional 
change after the establishment of its bases in 1951. The National Security Council 
removed from CNPq the prerogative to act on matters involving nuclear technology, 
which was transferred to the National Energy Council. Nuclear, created by Decree No 
40.110/56. Groups aligned with the nuclear technology procurement strategy were 
cut off from policy and the agency’s budget declined, along with the prestige of its 
bureaucracy.
THE SECOND PHASE OF INSTITUTIONALIZATION
Shortly after the conflicts that set the structure of CNPq, its actions were oriented 
towards the promotion of research, focusing on support for the formation of 
personnel. These guidelines were in line with the diagnoses from the then National 
Bank for Economic Development (BNDE), which identified the additional investments 
of the Brazilian economy to import technology as a vulnerable point that had to be 
resolved. Jayme Magrassi de Sá and José Pelúcio Ferreira, who, considering that there 
was a strong demand for technology in the productive sectors, proposed a solution 
that aimed to build endogenous capacity to satisfy it, directed the Bank’s actions in 
the S&T sector.
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Initially tested on an experimental basis, the first proposal came with the approval 
of BNDE Resolution No. 46/1958, which established the so-called “Education and 
Technical Training Quota”, an action instrument for the technological development of 
the industrial sector aimed at the training of staffhigh level technicians in the Brazilian 
industry. Ferrari (2010), in his account of BNDE’s actions in S&T during this period, 
recalls that the results of this program were not initially exciting: “[...] of the operations 
approved until August 1963, only 15 had been contracted, benefiting 11 industrial 
companies, 3 electric companies and 1 railroad; of these, only 3 made withdrawals to 
the “Cota de Educação” account, and only 1 depleted the credit granted to it ” (FERRARI, 
2010, p.301).
Even with the unsatisfactory results of the pilot project, BNDE expanded the 
initiative of the “Education and Technical Training Quota” program. José Pelúcio Ferreira 
was inspired by an article by José Leite Lopes, a prestigious physicist and director of 
CNPq, entitled “National Training and Research Centers for Brazilian Development” 
published by Tempo Brasileiro magazine in 1962 to propose BNDE Resolution No. 146 
/ 1964, which created the FUNTEC (Technical-Scientific Development Fund), intended 
to support postgraduate courses in the fields of Engineering and applied research in 
the basic industry (Ferrari 2010). FUNTEC resources had their application defined as 
follows:
 “40% (quarenta por cento) serão destinados à manutenção de Cursos de Pós- 
Graduação para a formação de Mestres em Ciências e Doutores em Ciências nos 
seguintes campos: Física; Química e Engenharia Química; Engenharia Metalúrgica; 
Engenharia Mecânica e Engenharia de Eletricidade” e “60% (sessenta por cento) 
serão destinados às Pesquisas Técnico Científicas, entendendo-se como tais os pro-
gramas, projetos piloto e experimentações Técnico-Científicas no campo das indús-
trias básicas” (FERRARI, 2010, p.301).
The difficulties of implementing the “Education Quota” pilot project were 
eventually overcome by FUNTEC: in 1964 only one project was contracted, this 
number increased to 7 in 1965, 8 in 1966, 14 in 1967 and 25 in 1968. Personal Contacts 
Bank bureaucrats and members of the university scientific community helped both 
to publicize the funding mechanism and to calibrate it to meet the demands of this 
sector. Ferrari gives us an example of how these contacts worked in part of his account:
“Lindolpho de Carvalho Dias, Diretor do Impa [Instituto de Matemática Pura e 
Aplicada], soube da existência do Funtec por intermédio de Coimbra [Alberto Luiz 
Coimbra], a quem ele encontrava na Universidade. Foi levado ao Banco por Paulo 
Vieira Belotti, Engenheiro da primeira leva do BNDE e amigo de Pelúcio e que tinha 
sido colega de Escola de Engenharia de Lindolpho. Levaram junto John Milne Albu-
querque Forman, professor de Geologia, e amigo comum. Tiveram uma primeira 
de várias conversas em que puderam defender a importância da inclusão de Ma-
temática e de Geociências entre as áreas que poderiam receber apoio do Funtec” 
(FERRARI, 2010, p.311).
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The tensions that could exist between the CNPq and BNDE bureaucracy groups 
were circumvented through the established personal contacts. They were instrumental 
in enabling coordination among the agencies involved in the implementation of the 
program. An important example of the coordinated action between these bodies was 
when BNDE, from 1969, began to release resources only for postgraduate programs 
that were recognized by CNPq. Shortly afterwards, the percentage quotas for the 
application of resources (40% for postgraduate courses and 60% for technical and 
scientific research for industrial application) were matched, and the thematic fields 
of postgraduate courses that could receive funding from the FUNC. Personal contact 
networks were fundamental for the coordination of actions and the establishment of 
consensus, enabling the effectiveness of the application of resources, which overcame 
the difficulties encountered for the pilot program of the late 1950s.
While these contacts ensured the quantitative results of applying FUNTEC, they 
also eventually became the cause of what Carlos Pacheco would later call “the fragile 
part of the model and its weakness” (PACHECO, 2003, p.9). This was because, with 
coordination, the parameters that graduate programs should follow were dictated by 
the scientific community of “hard sciences” and not by the real problems demanded by 
the “shop floor” of industrial sectors. This eventually reinforced the cycle of sustaining 
research funding that was in fact exogenous to the economic and social needs that 
BNDE bureaucrats intended to overcome by training masters and doctors in areas 
considered strategic. The signs of relevance and quality of research, which should, 
by the rationality of the BNDE, be aligned with the demands of the industrial base, 
were aimed at meeting the agendas of the big institutions and corporations of the 
then vice-politics of big science implemented mainly in the USA. The most prodigious 
Brazilian “hard science” scientists of the time, who had access to the CNPq’s decision-
making arena, kept close contact with the big science agenda. Mario Schenberg, José 
Leite Lopes, Oscar Sala, Cesar Lattes, Jayme Tiomno, Marcelo Damy and others are 
examples of this (VIEIRA & VIDEIRA, 2007).
Big science politics was more than just CT&I politics: the term was coined by Derek 
de Solla Price in Little Science, Big Science as the synthesis of a US government-led 
S&T strategy until the late 1970s (SOLLA PRICE, 1963). Big science was a state strategy 
whose objective was to guide the research agendas of the scientific communities of 
Latin America. This objective was important in order to broaden its capacity to face the 
political and ideological dispute that the United States played with the Soviet Union.
Analyzing databases of scientific publications, Solla Price found that 25% of 
researchers produced 75% of scientific articles in the “hard sciences” area in the US. For 
him, this would be the manifestation of something like a law of diminishing returns for 
state investments in S&T. His argument was that every society would have a limited 
number of individuals especially qualified for scientific, sporting, and artistic, among 
others. This would explain the concentration of articles in a restricted portion of the 
scientific community. Once the contingent devoted to the effective performance 
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of those activities is reached, the incorporation of more individuals would imply 
diminishing returns on investments.
The author then stated that the US had already reached the limit of efficient 
constitution of its scientific community. To insist on the endogenous increase of 
individuals who would take part in US scientific activities of the 1960s would mean 
losing the efficiency of state investment returns. The solution would then be to 
establish a strategy that could introduce relevant topics of technological development 
of US interest into the agenda of research communities in Latin American countries, 
for example, in which the formation of these communities was still far from reaching 
a considerable degree maturity. In short, the endogenous technological capacity 
building effort of the Brazilian industry projected by the BNDE also ended up 
contemplating the endogenous capacity expansion strategy of the US technological-
industrial-military complex.
It is during this period that international cooperation initiatives for the development 
of Latin American countries such as those of the “Alliance for Progress” (USAID) and the 
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) began to contribute resources to scientific 
and technological infrastructure projects (Derenusson, 2011). In Brazil, these external 
sources of funds were accounted for in a fund created in 1965: the Program Project 
Finance Fund, operated by BNDE, which two years later was transformed into the 
Public Financing Company for Studies and Projects, FINEP. Supported by the FUNTEC 
implementation model, Planning Minister João Paulo dos Reis Velloso proposes the 
creation of the National Fund for Scientific and Technological Development (FNDCT) 
in 1969. From 1971 FINEP, chaired by FUNTEC mentor José Pelúcio Ferreira, becomes 
the Executive Secretariat of the FNDCT.
The institutional and cognitive foundations that were then consolidated in the 
Brazilian PCTI were at their very birth very specific: what in other countries could be 
identified as science push or demand pull policies and programs, the first focused on 
supporting the agenda formulated by scientists and the second in economic and social 
demands, in Brazil became part of a project strongly centered on the bureaucratic 
rationality of an insulated planning. One aspect that has limited the success of this 
centrality bias is that the qualitative objectives that underlie the diagnoses have 
become less important than meeting the quantitative goals of their execution.
The political environment of the 1970´s and the very deepening of the centrality of 
insulated bureaucratic planning eventually laid the foundations of a policy paradigm 
whose institutional and discursive foundations are openly oriented toward the 
satisfaction of demands, but its cognitive foundations project action and interpret the 
reality by the logic of the science push model.
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THE GOLDEN AGE OF S&T BUREAUCRACY
With the resurgence of the authoritarian regime in the late 1960s, the institutional 
environment linked to S&T activities entered what we consider its third phase of 
the political-institutional trajectory. The normative measures of the previous period 
have been reinvigorated with the introduction of new funding mechanisms for 
the implementation of an S&T policy that should remain in line with priorities and 
demands. FUNTEC’s implementation model inspired the creation of the National Fund 
for Scientific and Technological Development (FNDCT) initially operated by FINEP. This 
period will record the uplift of CNPq as the central organ of PCTI. This was because, in 
addition to the structuring measures of implementation, measures were taken that 
promoted the institutional remodeling of the S&T subsystem, as was the case with 
CNPq and universities (Balbachevsky, 2010).
In this phase, some normative measures were intended to restructure the 
institutional foundations that set the policies of the previous period. Although 
commonly marked by the authoritarian bias that characterized the political 
environment at the time, they were clothed with modernizing senses. This is the case 
of the University Reform Law (Law N ° 5.540/68), which promoted changes in the 
institutional functioning of universities, creating, for example, the department as “the 
smallest fraction of the university structure”, which ended the chairs in a attempt to 
disarticulate the political groups that hegemonized the university spaces and were 
critical of the authoritarian regime.
At the same time, institutional changes were promoted in CNPq that would 
contribute to the resumption of its leading role in S&T policy. Decree No. 65.499 / 
69 instituted the regulation of its staff, which consolidated the institutionalization of 
the technical-scientific and administrative careers linked to the body. This moment 
marked the reestablishment of the cohesion of the bureaucracy’s internal groups, 
which contributed to the beginning of a new period of isolation that kept university 
professors and members of the scientific community from their decision-making 
spaces. In this phase, the foundations of the identity and the commitment that the 
bureaucracy’s internal networks would devote for a long time to the organ, which also 
gained a new legal format and new attributions, were established. These included the 
prerogative of “formulating and updating the policy of scientific and technological 
development”, thus rescuing the protagonism and prestige of the agency of the first 
half of the 1950s.
The political defeat of the internal groups of the 1950s was compensated in the 
1970s precisely because they identified the same “nationalist and developmentalist” 
values that discursively propelled the military regime. In the 1950s, the part of the 
scientific community that opposed Almirante Álvaro Alberto’s nuclear technology 
project took over the political direction of the S&T sector by directing its actions 
towards staff training, which helped them in the internal dynamics of university policy 
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and in structuring of graduate programs. Now the political game had changed: the 
scientific community groups that had gained prestige in the previous period were 
persecuted and their lives made difficult by the authoritarianism of the political 
regime. Meanwhile, internal groups in the S&T bureaucracy were returning to the 
arena of prestigious decision-making, enjoying considerable autonomy from the 
university scientific community.
With Law No. 6.129/74, the former “National Research Council” would be renamed 
“National Council for Scientific and Technological Development”, a name that remains 
today, constituted as a private law foundation linked to the Secretariat of Planning 
of Presidency of the Republic. The body assumed the coordination of the National 
Science and Technology System (SNDCT) created years before by Decree No. 70.553/72. 
The management of engineer José Dion de MeloTeles, a cadre of the technology 
bureaucracy between 1974 and 1979, is considered the highlight of the resumption of 
the decision-making centrality of the S&T bureaucrats for the developmental project 
of the military regime (CAMPOS MUNIZ, 2008). Throughout this period, the agency, 
in general, and José Dion in particular, receive political support from the Minister of 
Planning of the Presidency of the Republic, João Paulo dos Reis Velloso, a devotee of 
bureaucratic planning.
The consensus model established between the BNDE bureaucrats and the scientific 
community that then ran the CNPq around the execution of FUNTEC no longer worked 
so smoothly. The broader political context, with the escalation of political repression, 
has also contributed to the isolation of the university scientific community from 
the decision-making processes of S&T policy. These facts were fundamental in that 
for a long time, in the imagination of the Brazilian university environment of “hard 
sciences”, research oriented by demands and priorities were inexorably associated 
with conservative or obscurantist political choices and sectors of society, while 
research labeled “pure” were immediately associated with critical, emancipating, and 
progressive choices and behaviors.
An example of the kind of conflict that has emerged between S&T bureaucrats and 
university scientists is the nuclear agreement between Brazil and Germany, signed in 
1975. Representative bodies such as the Brazilian Society orchestrated the reaction of 
the scientific community for the Progress of Science (SBPC) and the Brazilian Society of 
Physics (SBF). The protests were directed to the CNPq, which would not have adopted 
consultation procedures and would not have called on the community of nuclear 
physicists to discuss the issue (MOREIRA, 2014). The fact is that the institutional political 
memory housed within the internal groups of the S&T bureaucracy blocked the 
participation of this community of scientists: 20 years after Álvaro Alberto’s resignation 
from the CNPq presidency, it was the scientific community, especially that of physicists, 
which was now isolated from politics.
Although isolated from the decision-making arena, the research agenda of 
the university scientific community was still heavily funded by the policies being 
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implemented. The diagnosis that postgraduate training had to be supported, which 
implied supporting scientists’ autonomously proposed research guidelines, already 
affected internal dynamics: quantitative implementation targets were achieved in 
programs that funded scientists. , which generated, in a second moment, more demand 
on the resources available for this type of action. This mechanism would eventually 
establish links between the sectors of bureaucracy linked to the operationalization 
of programs and the different sectors and members of the scientific community. An 
example of this is what happened at FINEP, FNDCT manager, which executed about 
80% of its budget in the areas of scientific development. With the financing crisis of 
the 1980s and the prioritization of financial support for projects that are in tune with 
demands, or “applied”, as has been said, the practice of “makeup” of basic projects in 
order to make them appear “applied” ”Had been widespread, with the complacency of 
FINEP staff (GUIMARÃES, 1995).
In 1979, Reis Velloso left the Planning Secretariat to make way for Mario Henrique 
Simonsen, who, while not exactly a critic of bureaucratic planning, was a recognized 
mathematician and economist who had contacts and a career in the university sector. 
He understood that the political direction of the state S&T sector should be open to 
the leading role of the scientific community. Thus, José Dion left the presidency of 
CNPq, and between 1979 and 1980, a renowned mathematician chaired the organ: 
Maurício Peixoto.
THE NEW REPUBLIC AND THE OLD CONFLICTS
As the end of the military regime approached, disputes intensified during the 
first half of the 1980s between groups established in the scientific community, 
with a political center in the physicist’s community, and bureaucracy groups, which 
included the military, at least command of the central body of the Brazilian PCTI. 
Mauricio Peixoto’s appointment as CNPqchairman in the late 1970s had strong 
political significance: it was the return of a scientist to the command of the organ, 
which satisfied the demands of the SBPC and other entities representing the scientific 
community. Peixoto’s management coincides with Simonsen’s management at the 
head of Planning. With the arrival of DelfimNeto in charge of the portfolio in 1980, the 
dispute, which did not cease during Peixoto’s administration, slipped to the side of 
the bureaucrats: engineer Lynaldo Cavalcanti took over the presidency in an intense 
backstage frenzy by physicist José Goldemberg, president of the Brazilian Society of 
Physics, competing for the nomination (CAMPOS MUNIZ, 2008). CNPq’s role as the 
central organ of the PCTI would be exhausted with the end of the military regime and 
the arrival of the New Republic.
From 1985, with the beginning of the new democratic period, the political 
coordination and planning functions of CNPq’s S&T sector were shifted to the newly 
created Ministry of Science and Technology (MCT). While the CNPq was “returned” to 
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the scientific community, the political elite of the insular bureaucratic groups in the 
Council migrated to the new ministry. In the democratizing discourse of that moment 
is embedded the diagnosis that the country’s difficulties in achieving relevant level of 
technological autonomy, that is, the failure of the policies implemented in the previous 
period, was due to the political isolation of the decision-making process imposed on 
the scientific community. The First National Development Plan of the New Republic 
states that “[...] at the root of the problems faced by the sector is the neglect to which 
the participation of the scientific community and other segments of civil society has 
been relegated to the decision-making process decision making”.
This context was also marked by the deep financing crisis of the economy. Its 
impact on the S&T sector and the political emergence of the scientific community 
and its entities at the new political moment led to the center of the decision-making 
arena diagnoses that proposed the institutionalization of the results of the systemic 
dynamics of the previous period. The policies that were discursively oriented towards 
meeting demands, funded by the FNDCT, as we have seen, ended up supporting 
the researchers’ autonomous agendas, in a manifestation of what Guimarães (1995) 
called the “adaptive reaction”, which relied on the consent of sectors of the community 
bureaucracy of S&T agencies. This, which occurred informally, took concrete shape in 
the decision-making arena of the 1980s in restructuring proposals that envisaged the 
allocation of FNDCT resources to agencies such as CNPq and CAPES. Although these 
proposals did not succeed, the debate around them marked the new environment 
of S&T policies that democratization brought: criticism of bureaucratic centrality and 
insulated planning placed the representative entities of the scientific community, such 
as the SBPC, as central actors. 
The immediate result of this was manifested in the early propositions of the period, 
which pointed to the suppression of programs or milestones of implementation 
identified with both demand-driven developmental diagnoses and the centrality of 
bureaucratic planning. It turns out that the implementation results of the previous 
period did not displease the scientific community. On the contrary, they reinforced 
their role and influence on the relational dynamics with the operational instances 
of the implementing agencies. The political priority of the scientific community was 
to remove bureaucratic cadres from the top management positions of the agencies. 
However, in 1985, the broad alliances that shaped the “New Republic” policy framework 
led to the creation of a central body for the S&T subsystem: the Ministry of Science and 
Technology. Its creation had the participation and support of part of the political elite 
of the S&T bureaucracy, specifically the one that adhered to the democratizing project. 
Opposition to the creation of the ministry was evident in the editorials of two SBPC 
publications, March 1 and June 2, 1985. The fear that the scientific community would 
be kept on the sidelines of the decision-making arena mobilized this setback (Videira, 
2010).
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The cohesion of bureaucratic groups formed in the political hues of the former 
“National Research Council” and reinforced with high-skilled technicians in the 1970´s 
was gradually weakened. The CNPq, while losing to the MCT its role of coordinator and 
formulator of the PCTI lost to the Ministry the elite of its bureaucratic staff, and turned 
to the implementation of programs aligned with the policy-type model science push. 
The remaining technical staff lost prestige and space in the decision making process. 
They were isolated from politics because of the military’s departure from the political 
scene and the proximity established with them in the previous period. This dynamic 
created an internal division in the bureaucratic groups, and during this period, a 
growing rivalry between the CNPq and the MCT bureaucrats began.
In the late 1990s, research institutes established at the time of the old Council, or 
linked to it over time, were directly managed by the Ministry, which further weakened 
CNPq’s functions, helping to erode the former cohesion of S&T bureaucracy groups. 
On the scientific community side, the picture has also become more complex. With 
the democratization of the country and the new political dynamics, the competition 
for institutional spaces was also internalized in this sector. The influence of the new 
groupings of party politics reorganized the scientific community groups, bringing 
new circumstances to their political dynamics. The criteria of relevance and quality 
of research were deepened and generalized from the perspective of “hard science” 
scientists, who assumed broad control and influence under the direction of the organ.
The Lattes Platform and Lattes Curriculum were institutional innovations of this 
period that endowed CNPq with an ability to coordinate actions unprecedented in 
its trajectory. Hall and Taylor (1996) argued that one of the ways in which institutions 
can affect actors’ behavior and build their action coordination capacity is to become a 
provider of information about actors. Thus, they can minimize the degree of uncertainty 
about behavior and focus on reciprocal expectations. By exposing relevant information 
about individual behaviors, institutions drive individuals to rational behavior, favoring 
the coordination of actions.
These innovations of the 1990´s helped to cleave the research community and 
consolidate the “hard sciences” community, especially that of physicists, as the 
political elite of the PCTI, as they were the sector that best responded to the signals 
of institutional coordination that were now emanating of CNPq. Hence the political 
differentiation that we understand to be analytically necessary between the scientific 
community and the academic community, due to the differentiated nature of the policy 
drivers of these communities: on the one hand, the interest groups that permeate the 
policy of the MCTI, the State S&T Secretariats and the Promotion Agencies; on the 
other, the groups that permeate the internal dynamics of the public universities, linked 
to the trade union and student movement, which are busier with the indications for 
the central positions of the universities. Although the networks structured within them 
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and the very politics and interests that mobilize them have many points of contact, 
their party closeness and alliances with other civil society interest groups are often 
different.
With the results of the historic personnel training policy, Brazil has graduated 
approximately 10,000 new doctors per year. The contingent of new scientists finds a 
consolidated institutional environment, and for most of them, the institutions of PCTI 
no longer play the role of coordinator of actions, encouraging rational behavior, as 
happened in the political remodeling of the sector in the 1990´s contingent, PCTI 
institutions are the providers of symbols, codes, and interpretations related to a certain 
social identity. For the new generation of Brazilian scientists, more specifically those 
of the “hard sciences” community, these institutions are the providers of the means 
of interpreting reality, constituting moral and cultural references for the various 
individuals, aligning behaviors and even their Preferences.
In the 2000s, the political groups that structure the state’s role in the Brazilian 
PCTI had considerable success in isolating the dynamics of decision-making from the 
contexts and debates of broader interest. Their isolation from broader politics was made 
possible with a recurringly wielded discourse of expertise, sometimes to legitimize 
their protagonist role in decision-making processes that involved controversial issues 
of broad interest. In this period, the satisfaction of social and economic demands was 
incorporated into both government and scientists discourse, it seems, much more as a 
legitimation strategy than as a consistent commitment (Sobral 2009).
PCTI, BUREAUCRACY AND POLITICS: A CONTEMPORARY 
ANALYSIS
The creation of the CNPq in the 1950s was marked by the hectic internal context 
and the new geopolitical configuration at the international level. The decision-
making arena was marked by intense conflicts arising from divergent ideas about 
the direction of nuclear policy. After this first phase, which had soon left significant 
marks on institutional memory, the programmatic consolidation of state actions in the 
S&T sector had been lulled by the diagnoses and priorities of national-developmental 
thinking. Choosing to support graduate programs as a central solution for endogenous 
technology development was an option that simplified the complexity of the real 
problem. Contemporary policy analysis theorists (KINGDON, 2002) have discussed the 
trap of one-dimensional solution to multi-dimensional problems. 
Kingdon talks about the multidimensional character of problems: the 
complexity that typifies social dynamics implies considering multiple aspects to 
explain phenomena, to describe them and, in the case of public policy, to solve 
problems. It turns out that it is very common to approach them one-dimensionally 
through government programs and actions. The choice of BNDE’s bureaucracy 
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to fund postgraduate programs for training highly skilled industry staff favored 
a one-dimensional solution. This option disregarded, for example, the necessary 
coordination of the research agenda, which sponsored technological education with 
the real demands of the economy’s industrial base. Even nowadays, the insertion of 
doctors is very low in sectors other than education. The debate on the purpose of the 
country is still current with the maintenance of considerable effort with the formation 
of masters and doctors: “para que sejamcapazes de gerarnovastecnologias, apenas 
escolher tecnologias importadas, ensinar novos pesquisadores? Para trabalhar em 
empresas, no governo, na academia?” (VELHO, 2001, p. 623).
The quantitative success of the implementation of FUNTEC seems to be another 
case of what Schneider (1994) had already described about the performance of the 
Brazilian state bureaucracy of the 1960´s and 1970´s. In the execution of FUNTEC, we 
identified the approximation of the BNDE bureaucracy with the scientific community 
through personal contacts. This result, known from the literature on the Brazilian 
executive branch, had not yet been demonstrated in analyzes of the institutional and 
programmatic structuring of the S&T sector. The failure of the program that preceded 
FUNTEC led to the mobilization of a network of personal contacts between BNDE 
bureaucrats and members of the scientific community, the former with the intention 
of demonstrating the validity of their diagnosis by achieving quantitative program 
implementation goals.
The insistence of BNDE bureaucrats on the FUNTEC execution model was 
somewhat the result of the broad autonomy that developmental isolation provided to 
the decision-making process. When professional bureaucracy operates in fields where 
it has considerable autonomy and stability with respect to social interests, bureaucrats 
can work to implement policies that meet their ideas and the needs of their careers 
and organizations (SKOCPOL, 1985; 1995; GEDDES, 1994). Behavioral modeling such 
as that proposed by the principal-agent theory is quite adequate both to explain 
the behavior of bureaucrats and scientists. In the structuring of Brazil’s technological 
development programs in the 1960s, information asymmetry, which by the principal-
agent theory is the foundation of adverse selection and moral hazard, was present in 
both delegation of the general problem to BNDE bureaucrats as to the relationship 
they had with scientists.
The policy option ultimately led to the deepening of a one-dimensional solution to 
the industrial-based technology deficiency, which reinforced years later the demands 
for funding for research activities mobilized by the “basic” or “pure” research argument. 
This reinforcement of inputs brought about by the results of policy implementation 
and leading to the stabilization of outputs is known as negative feedback, a concept 
in contemporary policy analysis literature brought about by punctuated equilibrium 
theory (BAUMGARTNER & JONES, 2002; 1991; JONES, BAUMGARTNER & TRUE, 1998).
The punctuated equilibrium theory describes policy subsystems as being able to 
keep their output stable or radically modify them rapidly to adapt to pressures arising 
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from interaction with their external environment. This is because policy implementation 
recursively affects its own inputs, dynamically redefining them through the action 
of negative and positive feedback. Negative feedback generates the stabilization of 
policies, are the factors that attract the policy trajectory for permanence and stability. 
The interests that are organized around implementation, preference satisfaction, and 
beliefs in diagnostics and causal relationships shape the effects of negative feedback. 
These effects explain the stability of policies, manifesting themselves in operational 
standardization, “golden rules”, symbols and logic of interpretation. The literature 
reports the strength of these stabilizing effects in policy areas marked by expertise, 
and in them the formation of limited participation subsystems is common, which 
often leads single actors to exert a monopoly on policy (HELLSTRÖM, 2000; HIRSCH 
& SHOTTS, 2014).
Positive feedback encompasses the factors that generate instability in the 
subsystem and its results. Its effects favor the occurrence of changes, policy innovation 
and the emergence of new institutions. The preponderance of the positive feedback 
effects on the negative initiates short-lived contexts that make it possible for decision 
makers to shift their attention to aspects of problems previously overlooked by the 
implemented solutions. This is what happened in the context of the transition to the 
new democratic regime in the mid-1980s: political regime change was the context 
that favored institutional change and innovation. The MCT was created at this historic 
moment, the entities representing the scientific community assumed a strong role in 
defining the institutional directions of the PCTI. This conjuncture favored the removal 
of cadres of the professional S&T bureaucracy from the spaces of power, won in 
disputes by members of the scientific community. However, there were no content 
changes in the policy model because the interests, beliefs and ideas of the scientific 
community were already satisfied.
Guimarães’s report (1995) reproduced an important diagnosis made at that time, 
presented as the final report of the “Commission of Scientific Societies”, debated at the 
37th SBPC Meeting in July 1985. On the model of fostering scientific and technological 
development, we transcribe an excerpt from the author’s reproduction:
“Em uma avaliação de conjunto, a organização desenvolvida nos últimos 35 anos 
deve ser aperfeiçoada, mas sem mudanças drásticas, preservando-se o papel das 
diferentes agências e seu caráter pluralístico. [...] Muitos dos problemas pelos quais 
este tem passado se prendem à orientação tecnocrática de algumas Direções, mais 
preocupadas em ‘procurar’, ‘planejar’, ‘avaliar’, ‘administrar’, ‘acompanhar’ e ‘coorde-
nar’, a atividade científica do que em promover o seu desenvolvimento” (GUIMA-
RÃES, 1995, p.6).
The context of destabilization, the emergence of positive feedback elements, 
contradicts the perception that there has been no paradigmatic policy change. This 
brings into consideration Paul Pierson’s cited critique of the theory of punctuated 
equilibrium. Knowledge of the historical trajectory of politics is essential to understand 
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why the scientific community criticized the “technocratic orientation” of the decision-
making process while recommending a “no drastic change” policy. The creation of the 
Ministry met with strong resistance from this actor, who, although a new political player 
in decision-making spaces, acted openly conservatively. The very consolidation of the 
Ministry took place slowly: between 1985 and 1992, the Ministry was extinguished 
and recreated several times, sometimes as an appendix of the Ministry of Industry, 
sometimes as a Secretariat linked to the Presidency of the Republic. It was not until 
1992 that the Ministry of Science and Technology gained stability as a central organ 
of the CT&I sector.
The research effort of the historical trajectory of the Brazilian PCTI and its analysis 
under the spotlight of broader theoretical frameworks used in different policy sectors, 
allows for broadening the debate on its programs and agendas. Comparative studies 
of the dynamics in the CT&I and other policy sectors can also help streamline analytics 
and contribute to building broader shared solutions. The theoretical references and 
the Brazilian tradition in the studies on executive power have much to contribute to 
the also traditional field of studies on science, technology and innovation policies in 
Brazil.
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CONCLUSIONS
Throughout the text, we show that the scientific community of hard sciences 
has established strong ties with the CT&I bureaucracy throughout the period of 
institutionalization of this policy in the country. Personal contact networks were 
central to the implementation variants that were being adopted: the interest of 
bureaucrats in confirming their diagnoses and propositions for solution led to the 
replacement of qualitative policy objectives by the fulfillment of quantitative targets, 
which would then dominate, relevance criteria for the policy makers since then. The 
demand for the programs and actions proposed by the implementing agencies and 
the scale that would denote their relevance came from the scientific community in 
increasing cadence because it was feedback. Bureaucrats were pleased that they were 
“right” because the programs under their charge were increasingly in demand, and 
scientists were pleased to see their research agenda thrive.
The more than 60 years of institutionalized PCTI under the inspiration of the science 
push model has crystallized beliefs and values about it that are now homogeneously 
shared in the most diverse arenas: by almost all funding agencies and agencies, by the 
main groups of party politics, by major media outlets and media and, consequently, 
by the general public. In Brazil, there has not yet been a significant moment of public 
criticism of the results of science or of the role of scientists, either in the mold of what 
has already happened in other countries or in the mold of what might be closer to 
local needs.
The rejection of arguments of the demand pull paradigm has precedents in the 
peculiar political trajectory of this sector in Brazil. The political leaders of the scientific 
community were excluded from the bold decision-making dynamics of the 1970s 
due to the context of authoritarianism that rocked the country. The university-linked 
social sectors were disliked by military leaders and commonly associated with the 
bluntest confrontations the authoritarian regime suffered. This seems to have been 
one of the moments of the Brazilian PCTI when the best results were achieved in 
terms of developing endogenous technological capacity, but it was marked by the 
bureaucratic isolation of the decision-making process and the political context of a 
military dictatorship. Later, with democratization in the mid-1980´s, the scientific 
community emerged as a sector that had resisted dictatorship, which, in the new 
regime, brought their representative entities and their leaders to a level of political 
hegemony in the similar PCTI arena that which occurred in the US immediately after 
World War II and which was responsible for founding the science push paradigm. The 
result was contempt for state planning in CT&I because it drew on the experience 
of the 1970s, and the beginning of a phase in which the science push PCTI model 
became, beyond a paradigm, a political reference stable subsystem.
At present, other notions need to guide priority setting and government planning 
in ST&Iin a democratic context, responsiveness and accountability become goals 
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